This paper explores the links between the patterns of migration (high vs. low-skill) 
Introduction
Globalization has become a major feature of the modern economic world. For many, the integration of goods and factor markets is believed to bring substantial gains to the countries opening their borders to trade, foreign capital and migration, although labor markets are from being integrated. For example, the annual earnings premium for a Mexican worker in the US is around 17,500$ and multilateral negotiations on reducing barriers to labor mobility are not on the agenda. According to received wisdom, one would expect that the combination of sharp reduction in trade costs and in policyerected barriers to trade in goods would reduce migratory pressures as trade in goods would tend to close the gap in wage rates across countries, in other words, one would expect that trade and migration are substitutes. Applying the same reasoning, one would expect that reductions in the barriers to investment, reflected in growing FDI, would also reduce migratory pressures, i.e. one would expect that FDI and migration are substitutes. Likewise, until recently trade and FDI were largely viewed as substitutes: high trade costs and policy-erected barriers to trade would be associated with an increase in what is now called horizontal or tariff-jumping FDI.
In spite of the joint determination of migration, investment (FDI) and trade, the large and growing theoretical and empirical literatures on the migration-investment-trade nexus have not been analyzed in an integrated framework. Diaspora and human capital effects have been emphasized in the migration-FDI literature 1 ; the nature of FDI (vertical or horizontal) has been emphasized in the FDI-trade literature 2 ; and substitutability-complementarity 1 Cecchi, De Simone and Faini (2007) question the virtuous circle between Human Capital (HC) and FDI proposed in the literature on the 'brain gain' initiated by Mountford (1997) . Using data on skilled migration rates for 1990 and 2000, they find that tertiary enrolment is conditionally correlated positively with FDI (countries experiencing continuous FDI would then upgrade their skill content). However, at the same time the effect of this positive association on enrolments is eliminated by the negative correlation between tertiary school enrolment and emigration. Moreover, they obtain a negative conditional correlation between secondary enrolments and FDI.
2 Recent models of trade and FDI distinguish between vertical FDI (VFDI) that takes advantage of differences in factor costs and tariff-jumping or horizontal FDI (HFDI) that seeks to avoid trade costs. With high trade costs, horizontal FDI (HFDI) takes places, while with sufficiently different factor proportions between countries (and sufficiently low trade costs), vertical FDI (VFDI) will take place. In this framework developed by Markusen (2004) relations have been emphasized in the trade-migration literature 3 . It should not be surprising then that in a recent survey of the literature, Schiff (2007) concludes that what he calls the MIT (for migration, investment and trade) linkages are complex, making it difficult to draw suggestive policy recommendations for source or sending countries.
Recent data on the skill-composition of emigration for 1990 and 2000 compiled by shows that it is especially SouthNorth migration of skilled labor that has increased and that for all but the large developing countries, skilled emigration is a sizeable fraction of the labor force (Docquier (2007) , Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007) ). The recent availability of this data makes it possible to incorporate the skill-composition of emigration in the debate about the links between trade, migration and FDI and explore to the channels through which emigration affects welfare in sending countries earlier identified in the 'brain drain ' literature. 4 This paper continues the exploration of the links between FDI, trade and the composition of migration, considering all three jointly. In section 2 we build a skeleton model of a price-taking economy with skilled and unskilled labor in which FDI flows respond to differences in rates of return. This allows us to link FDI flows to trade costs and to the skilled-unskilled migration and Navaretti and Venables (2005) , HFDI substitutes for trade and VFDI creates trade. Using macro data, find support for the predictions of these models. They find that investment liberalization among countries with similar factor endowments stimulates exports when trade costs are low whereas investment liberalization reduces trade for countries with similar size and endowments when trade costs are high. 3 The literature on trade and migration has recently emphasized complementarities either because of credit constraints preventing the emigration of unskilled workers, or because of diaspora effects operating in the literature on ethnic networks in international trade. However, most of the evidence is for the US. 3 Evidence supportive of complementarities in bilateral trade between host and sending countries has been found for the US (Gould (1994) , Head and Ries (1998) , Rauch and Trinidade (2002) and Rauch and Casella (2003) ). The role of diasporas has also been emphasized in several case studies on Information Technology between the US and India and between the US and Israel (Arora and Gambardella (2005) ). Again, relying on US data, Kugler and Rapoport (2005, 2007) find that FDI in services are positively correlated with diaspora stocks indicating complementarities, whereas for manufactures unskilled diasporas and FDI are substitutes. Docquier and Lodigiani (2006) find evidence of positive externalities between skilled migration and FDI suggesting 'brain gain' effects associated with skilled migration. 4 The 'brain drain' literature has been challenged on several fronts. Three channels have been identified to transform a 'brain drain' into a 'brain gain':(i) skilled migrants remit relatively large amounts; (ii) selective immigration policies in host countries may raise the attractiveness of migration for high-skilled individuals, which in turn raises the private returns to education via a reduced supply inducing an additional investment in education in the host country; (iii) network effects may lead to technology transfer via FDI between host and sending countries pattern of the sending country. The model serves to link patterns of FDI to a few structural characteristics (the labor market and trade structure) of the economy. Section 3 gives recent trends on the skill composition of emigration over between 1990 and 2000 justifying the adopted modeling assumptions.
Section 4 then estimates the relation between FDI and the skill-composition of emigration for a sample of 104 over the period 1990-2000. Results are encouraging, suggesting that the skill-composition of emigration matters for the pattern of FDI inflows.
Migration, Trade and FDI: A Skeleton Model
In view of the importance of migration in many sending countries, we develop a model that captures some of the economy-wide effects associated with emigration and the skill-composition of emigrants. Emigration is considered exogenous (subject to emigration policies in receiving countries), and capital is internationally mobile, responding to differences in the return to capital. Take then an economy producing two goods, non-traded ( and exported and to simplify, assume that all the production of the sector is exported. Three fully-employed factors are available in fixed amounts in the economy: two types of industry-specific labor, (employed in the nontraded sector) and (employed in export sector), and capital
Labor is internationally mobile (exogenously), but sector-specific while capital is intersectorally mobile within the economy with FDI responding to endogenously determined changes in the domestic return to capital. 5
Constant returns to scale neoclassical production functions with a constant elasticity of substitution between factors describe the technology. Let be the amount of specific factor necessary to produce one unit of good of the non-traded (exported) good. The amount of capital (mobile factor) necessary to produce one unit of the non-traded (export) good is equal 
1ˆˆˆˆˆ( )
where a '^' over a variable denotes the percentage change in that variable:
R is the reward to the mobile factor;
is factor's share in total income generated in sector ;
is the fraction of capital factor absorbed by the sector ; j
⎟ is the elasticity of substitution between factors in sector j; Consider now the links between migration (assumed to be exogenous) and induced capital flows. To find the effect of migration on the reward to capital and consequently on FDI flows, consider first the change in the price of non-traded good induced by labor flows and in a second step the effect on the reward to capital. Solve then the system consisting of (0.2) and the log differentials of (0.3) and (0.4) assuming that only labor endowments change and exports and imports prices are exogenous. This gives the system:
Solving (0.6) provides the expression linking the equilibrium domestic price to factor endowments.
where
The impact of factor endowments change on the domestic price is straightforward. From (0.7), emigration of labor specific to the non-traded 
with the indirect effect vanishing when goods are perfect substitutes in consumption (
or the marginal rate of transformation in production is infinite (
. Rearranging the above expression yields:
Emigration of export-specific labor leads to a reduction in the reward to capital, i.e. to FDI outflow ( ) 
If imports and non-traded goods are good substitutes in consumption , then a reduction in import-related costs
which lowers the relative price of imports will lead to a decrease in the price of the home good, A reduction in export-related transaction costs N p ( ) 0 dε > will make export goods more profitable and will always increase , with the effect vanishing when it becomes costless to shift resources across sectors, i.e. when
The effect of changes in trade costs on the reward to capital is given by:
If the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic good is less than 1, the reduction in trade costs (lower µ or higher ε ) will result in higher price of capital and positive FDI. The effect of a reduction in trade costs on FDI works independently of the effects of the composition of emigration.
To sum up, the skeleton model is useful to investigate Migration-FDI and Trade-FDI links. Starting with Migration-FDI links, it indicates that the skill composition of migration will have an impact on FDI with the possibility that emigration of non-traded labour will have an ambiguous effect on the profitability of FDI with the possibility of a complementarity relation. As to the Trade-FDI links, the model results can be linked to the literature on market-seeking (HFDI) and efficiency-seeking (VDFI). Take the case of HFDI.
Then, if imports and domestic substitutes are good substitutes in consumption , an increase in the barriers to imports will attract FDI, as predicted by the HFDI literature. Take now the case of VFDI. Then a decrease in traderelated costs will make outsourcing more profitable and hence export activities in the home-country with a resulting increase in FDI.
( 1 σ > )
Stylized facts on emigration patterns
Predictions about the pattern of emigration on FDI suggested by the model are going to be confronted to data on FDI between 1990 and 2000 for 104 migration sending countries. The usefulness of the model rests on the plausibility of two key assumptions: (i) the disaggregation between skilled and unskilled emigration; (ii) the importance of general equilibrium effects when studying the impact of emigration on FDI. As a prelude to the econometric estimates that follow, we take a look at emigration patterns over the period considered. 
To capture the change in the relative skill level, we take the change in the skill gap, where the skill gap is now defined as 
Including an adequate set of controls is a first challenge since the links between FDI, migration and trade barriers depend on a host of other factors.
To name the most important ones, we include a measure of remoteness, a proxy for the skill composition of exports, income per capita and its growth rate, and proxies for the quality of institutions and political stability that would influence the return to investment.
A second major challenge is reverse causality since the relationship between FDI and migration is likely to go both ways. 6 One the one hand, migration influences FDI through the change in capital price (as our model suggests) or via other channels such as migrant networks (not included in the model). On the other hand, FDI is also likely to influence migration, and in particular that of skilled labour. Higher levels of FDI may increase the demand for skilled labour or increase overall income, thereby reducing migration. Or, if financial constraint to migration is binding, higher income generated by FDI may lead to higher outflows of workers.
As potential instruments that would be potentially correlated with migration rates (but not directly with FDI), we rely on a wide range of nationlevel health indicators (the prevalence of HIV and tuberculosis, healthy life expectancy, share of new-borns with low weight, infant mortality, government expenditures for health etc), as well as a variable capturing exposure to natural disasters -share of population affected by floods. We expect that emigration rates, and especially the outflows of the high-skilled, should be higher in countries where certain health indicators, such as HIV prevalence, are less favourable. We also expect that higher country's exposure to floods increases the emigration of high-skilled (they prefer to live in countries which are less exposed to natural disasters). Because most health-care indicators are strongly correlated, our final choice of instruments consists of three variables -floods, HIV prevalence and tuberculosis prevalence. These variables explain 6 Education levels influence both FDI and migration decisions, and past migration has been found to influence current FDI through network effects, Checchi et al. (2007) ). FDI is also sensitive to the political and economic environment of the host country. In turn migration is influenced by the networks between migrants in FDI outflow countries and migrant sending countries, Rauch and Trinidade (2002) , Rauch and Casella (2003) .
around 16% of variation of both high-skilled emigration rate (
and the skill gap, ( ) it SG which are highly correlated.
Sample and Data
The sample of migration sending countries is chosen by excluding 25 "traditional" immigration countries 7 as well as developed Asian countriesJapan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand 8 from the whole sample of countries covered by . Restricting the change in labour force to changes in the composition of emigration neglects factors other than emigration that affect education levels, such as education policies, and linkages between human capital and emigration. Short of modelling the supply of skills directly as in e.g. Checchi et al., note that some of the factors affecting the supply of skills like income per capita, and its growth rate, are included among the controls as well as other factors such as our measure of political stability. This said, the results in 7 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 These countries are excluded because of high skill intensity of exports making them less comparable to other MSC and being potentially immigration receiving countries. 9 By taking averages, we are also able to cope with the problem of missing data for countries which became independent in the early 1990s (e.g. countries in Central and Eastern Europe). 10 Using data from Beine et al (2007) we control for the age of entry of high-skilled immigrants (at least 22). This allows excluding emigrants who obtained their education in the country of destination and never participated in the labour force of their country of origin. Remoteness is measured by the inverse of the distance-weighted GDP and comes from Andrew Rose's database. For each country i and year t , remoteness is defined as
, where j represent all other 11 For the period 1990-1995, tariff data is missing for many countries so we also experimented with interpolation to fill missing data to measure trade liberalization as (tariff (2000)-tariff (1990)/1+ tariff (1990)). We also computed 10 years tariff average. Neither was significant. Given that a change in tariffs will have a different incentive on FDI according to whether the country is receiving HFDI or VFDI, this is not surprising. . We take logs of all three variables. Table 1 In spite of the included controls and the above robustness checks, it could well be that this apparently robust correlation is spurious. It could be due to some omitted variable affecting both FDI and emigration. For example, it could be changes in immigration policies in host countries would have fostered diasporas which in turn could have contributed to changes in the perception about the attractiveness of FDI, or to changes in FDI policies in migration-sending countries. This is an area we plan to pursue further.
Results

Summary
This paper pursues the investigation of the channels linking FDI, migration and trade for migration sending countries in a unified framework suitable for empirical investigation with macro data. We build a two-sector model representative of a developing economy where the export good is not consumed at home and where imports and domestically produced goods compete in consumption, capital is mobile between the two production sectors and two labour categories are sector-specific along Ricardo-Viner lines.
Assuming that (horizontal) FDI responds to changes in the reward to capital, 18 As with the results in table 1, instruments are not rejected when we do not control for heteroscedasticity. Given the significance of the dummy variable for small islands, this confirms the fact that small islands are important and different as was already mentioned in the discussion of the patterns in figure 1. Clearly other instruments would be desirable for a restricted sample of developing countries that would exclude small islands, though there is no a priori reason to exclude small islands, especially in an otherwise small cross-section sample.
we investigate the effects of changes in the skilled and unskilled labour force (emigration is assumed exogenous and determined by immigration policies in host countries) on FDI. If exports in migration sending countries are relatively less skill intensive than non-traded goods, a skewed pattern of emigration towards skilled labour which raises the price of the non-traded good will also raise the net capital reward, thereby leading to positive FDI. In this set-up, emigration of skilled labour is complementary with FDI whereas in the standard trade-theoretic models, trade and factor movements are substitutes: the outflow of one factor of production (here aggregate or skilled labour) raises the return to the remaining factor (capital) more abundant and therefore would induce their outflow. In the skeleton model developed here, with a non-traded sector and different skill-intensities between the nontraded good and exports, the substitutability proposition can be reversed if the non-traded sector is relatively skill-abundant. While non-traded sectors are usually assumed to be low-skill intensive, recent migration patterns suggest that this may not always be the case. The results also extend the channels through which linguistic fractionalization and religious diversity affect developing-country performance. Whereas previous channels emphasized growth and corruption, we find here that linguistic fractionalization is negatively correlated with FDI inflows (capturing less public goods) while the opposite is the case for religious diversity (capturing higher quality of government). 
0.0170*** 0.004 L(1990) , in %(.) 0.0178*** 0.004 Skill-intensive exports is a share of machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) in total exports.
Political stability index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance outcomes.
Linguistic and religious fractionalization indexes range from 0 to 1. Higher values correspond to higher linguistic and religious diversity.
Persian Gulf dummy equals 1 for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, otherwise 0. Transition dummy equals 1 for countries of the former socialist block, including ex-Yugoslavia, otherwise 0. 
